

MASS MEDIA and the **ELECTORAL PROCESS** in Nigeria

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BOKO HARAM AND TRANSNATIONAL TERRORISM IN AFRICA: IMPLICATIONS FOR POLITICAL COMMUNICATION AND MEDIA DEVELOPMENT

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Introduction

The menace of cross-border terrorism in Africa and the unabated rise of Boko Haram as a deadly and major terror group in Nigeria have raised concerns globally. Cross-border terrorism, which is regarded in this chapter as transnational terrorism, has also challenged political and developmental experts because of its unprecedented impact on all sectors of the affected nations, which carry the added burden of managing their undeveloped economic status with the problems associated with terrorism.

The recent wave of terrorism in Africa is phenomenal in its origin and nature because it encompasses political, ethnic and historical undertones with greater emphasis on the elevation of Islamic religion above other tenets of modern life. This phenomenon poses several questions which many scholars are trying to answer. The chapter therefore evaluates the catalysts to the growth of transnational terrorism in Africa with emphasis on how Boko Haram with origins in Nigeria has escalated the situation by raising the bar of violence and internationalizing its terror operations beyond Nigeria. The chapter also examines the tripartite connections between Boko Haram and al-Qaeda in the Maghreb (AQIM) in Mali and the fall of the Gaddafi's regime in Libya, which promoted cross-border networking amongst terrorist groups operating in Africa. This chapter also examined common factors in terms of vision and mission which drive Boko Haram and some other terrorist groups in the African continent. The highpoint of this chapter is a discourse on the implications of cross-border terrorism by Boko Haram on political communication and media development

in Nigeria and Africa at large.

Africa, and in this case Nigeria, has had its fair share of conflicts. However, terrorism did not begin in Africa or Nigeria but today Africa is worst hit by terrorism as she suffers the greatest casualty figures of violent deaths and losses. As at December 2015, Boko Haram has now topped the list of most violent terror organisations in the entire world for the year 2015. In other words, the group is now championing the cause to annihilate the human race in the region. Since 2009 to date (2009-2016), thousands of people have been either killed or maimed in the North Eastern part of Nigeria by Boko Haram. They are “using such violent tactics as placement of improvised explosive devices (IEDs), targeted assassination, drive-by shooting and suicide bombing” (Onuoha, 2013).

Boko Haram literally translates as western education is forbidden. As a result of its activities in Nigeria and Sub-Saharan Africa, properties worth millions of dollars have been destroyed and thousands of people including children, women, and the elderly, have been killed by this group. According to the former Nigerian president under whom Boko Haram became a very deadly group, Goodluck Jonathan, “the costs are high: over 13,000 people have been killed, whole communities razed, and hundreds of persons kidnapped, the most prominent being the mindless kidnap of innocent girls from Chibok Secondary School, in North East Nigeria” (Smith-Spark, 2014). The casualty figures of deaths caused by Boko Haram have since risen to about 16,000.

In an attempt to understand the objectives and operations of Boko Haram, Olumba interviewed a social psychologist, Dr. Chijioke Uba of the University of London, who noted that “motivation for action or behaviour is tied to or underpinned by 'reason' as exhibited by the members of Boko Haram. As such, when you believe that something is reasonably justified, you may keep doing it until you are convinced otherwise”. Continuing, Uba (2014) notes that, “moral reason is strong, and could be used to justify behaviour (even atrocities such as killing).”

Boko Haram's activities are implicitly tied to religion (Islam), that is, the philosophy justifying their actions is an interpretation of what is 'right' (e.g. Jihad). This is backed by a psychological impetus that justifies the engagement in atrocious behaviour (e.g. killing) that is consistent with the moral reason. He went further to argue that their motives are economic in nature though with religious and political undertones, “Islamic states' creation is as political as it is religious, and where the issue of power comes into play one cannot neglect the implicit connection to economics” (Uba, 2014). Uba argues further that for us to get a solution to this menace, we must understand to what “...extent the warped philosophy and twisted narrative underpinning the 'being' of the group can be done away with”. To him, the use of military action alone will not bring an end to groups like Boko Haram and others but will give a temporary relief for them to resurface later as Boko Haram did after its predecessor was crushed in the '90s.

What then are the factors that have contributed to the rise of transnational terrorism in West Africa? Cross-border terrorism, boko-terrorism (as recently described by Ekeanyanwu, 2016), or just terrorism cannot be divorced from ethnocentrism and irredentism. On a larger scale, terrorism is usually a negative reaction against bad governance, inept leadership, ethno-religious rivalries and ethnic nationalism struggles among nationals of a particular nation or nationals of different countries. In the Nigerian case, Ekeanyanwu (2014) identifies “the epileptic Nigerian school system, massive youth unemployment, high-level illiteracy, poor or non-existent infrastructure, political and economic corruption, and poor security apparatus as forces that helped Boko Haram's emergence and sustenance”. He also noted that “some powerful political forces within the northern part of Nigeria are using Boko Haram to negotiate their way back to power” and that “the economic conditions in Nigeria have helped the group recruit members and get some sympathy from a section of the public” (Ekeanyanwu, 2015, p. 185).

For deeper insights and understanding of the complex intra/inter-relationships among the different ethnic/cultural groups and religions that exist in Nigeria, the Social Identity theory was used to explain how these variables interact to influence human behaviour. In other words, the Social Identity theory helped us to explain what happens when heterogeneous groups with different religious affinity interact, and how these disparities among them create the platform for rivalry and conflict, which is amplified to what we now call terrorism.

Theoretical Framework

The Social Identity theory was used to give this chapter some theoretical perspective. Self-identity of individuals and how they view themselves and others outside their perceived groups, in many ways, influence the pattern of their interaction to and with these 'others'. According to Chen & Li (2009), Social Identity theory was developed by Tajfel and Turner in 1979 to understand the psychological basis for intergroup discrimination. According to this theory, “social identity has three major components: Categorization, Identification and Comparison” (Chen & Li, 2009, p. 2).

By using the Social Identity theory as inferred by Chen & Li (2009) in order to explain its relevance to the case study, one can argue that categorization component will refer to how we put ourselves and others into categories, for example 'putting people' into certain categories like Muslims, Christians, Feminists or Pagans. Whereas the Identification component can explain how we see ourselves and others, like putting others into an 'out-group'; and ourselves and people whom we think that are identifiable with us into the 'in-group'; it explains why we can condone and even applaud violence against the 'out-group'. It follows then that for example one ethnic nationality can applaud or condone it if a member of another ethnic nationality is inflicted with violence. This situation is common in the northern part of Nigeria which has a predominantly Muslim population and home to Boko Haram.

The last but not the least is the comparison component which explains how we 'compare our groups with the other groups', making it possible to have positive bias for our group. The comparison component can be likened to the expected and/or assumed differences which can culminate into roles and expectations which are influenced by the categorization and identification components. This theoretical model is relevant in uncovering the cause of the phenomenon called Boko Haram and the basic reasons for the growth of transnational terrorism in that part of the world. The three components of this theory namely; Categorization, Identification and Comparison can be used to explain the basic reasons for the growth of transnational terrorism in Africa and in Nigeria in particular.

The categorization component can explain how and why people see themselves as different from others. Muslims tend to see Christians differently, which can result to bigotry and intolerance. The Identification model explains how we see others from the perspective of our ethnic identity, how a Hausa person sees an Igbo person and vice versa. With manipulations and time, this can result into ethnocentrism. In Africa and especially Nigeria, ethnocentrism stands at a pivotal point as one of the root causes of violence. The comparison component tends to reinforce the assumed negativities from the other two components. The comparison component can be likened to the expected and/or assumed differences which can culminate into behavioural patterns, values and symbols. For example, issues related to gender and sexual equality are very important in the western societies whereas in the Arab societies, these issues may not be seen as such. Therefore, Huntington (1996) was right when he outlined the importance of culture and cultural identities in the cohesion of people and also as the disintegration and eruption of conflicts in the post-Cold war era.

Cross-Border Terrorism and Boko Haram

One of the primary functions and objectives of every sovereign state is the protection of lives and property of its citizens. In recent times, this function does not solely lie in the hands of one state but has transcended into a global concern. Transnational terrorist organizations like Al-Qaeda through their activities have transformed international security dimensions and discourse. And as a result, Khusrav, Todd and Donggyu (2013, p. 6) suggest that "the presence of a common driver suggests that any war on transnational terrorism requires some international collective action." According to them, this is the potent weapon to contain the phenomenon of terrorism.

There are no widely acceptable definitions of terrorism and terrorist acts though most definitions share similar contents. There is a widely known cliché which states that one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter. It is also not in our best interest to continue to fight about the definition of terrorism while the act itself goes unchecked. For the benefit of doubt and to serve as our working description of this evil phenomenon in this chapter; we will attempt to differentiate two acts of which one is a

terrorist act and the other a non-terrorist act. Meggle (2006, p. 2) argues that “T-acts (Terrorists acts) are successful if both the violence calculus and the terror calculus, actually work – the former with the help of the latter. Every T-act (every T-act-Attempt) aims at and relies on the success of this connection. It is precisely this linkage between the two calculi that differentiates T-acts from non-T-acts”.

Meggle (2006) goes further to list the components of a terrorist act thus:

"Act/Action A	Activation of the bomb
Actor X	Provincial separatist
Violence addressee Y	Café customers
Terror addressee Z	The general public
Final addressee F	The government
Final Intended effect R	Release of prisoners"

Thus in a terrorist act, Meggle (2006) continues,

1. Act A will be carried out or attempted (activation of bomb)
2. Actor X who is aggrieved and a member of a group with a motive is willing to perform Act A
3. Violence addressee Y, who maybe be also a member of public will be there to get Act A
4. Terror Addressee Z, who maybe a member of government will get Act A or its impact (fear)
5. Final Addressee F, who maybe a member of Y & Z may be impacted by Act A and Effect R
6. Final intended effect R, maybe be done to the pleasure of Actor X (Meggle, 2006).

Terrorist acts end up forming in our mind what terrorism is all about. Enders and Sandler (2005) attempt to explain what terrorism is all about when they argue thus: “terrorism is the premeditated use or threat of use of extranomial violence or brutality by subnational groups or individuals to obtain a political objective through intimidation or fear directed at a large audience” (Enders and Sandler 2005, p. 467). They go further to explain that transnational terrorism happens “when a terrorist incident in one country involves victims, perpetrators, or audiences in two or more countries.... A terrorist act may be transnational owing to its impact, its planning and execution, its perpetrators (if known), or its targets and resulting damage”.

To make it unvarnished in understanding, Khusrav, Todd and Donggyu (2013) distinguish a terrorist act from a non-terrorist act when they argued that “terrorists acts are violence with political or social motives; violent acts without such motives are criminal acts and do not count as terrorism”. To further explain what a terrorists act is all about, Enders and Sandler (2005) bring into perspective the severity and barbarity of this acts, when they argued that “terrorist acts are purposely brutal to create an atmosphere of fear while publicizing the terrorists' cause”. They also bring to the argument regarding to the communication aspects of terrorism – media needs - when

they argued that there is a need by the actors to publicize their cause.

There are two types of terrorism as argue by Khusrav, Todd and Donggyu (2013), domestic and transnational. The former is “events (that) involve perpetrators, victims, and audience from just the host or venue country” and the latter “concerns perpetrators, victims, or audience from two or more countries”. Still on Enders and Sandler (2005), “when a terrorist incident in one country involves victims, perpetrators, or audiences in two or more countries; terrorism takes on a transnational character. A terrorist act may be transnational owing to its impact, its planning and execution, its perpetrators (if known), or its targets and resulting damage”.

Robison, Crenshaw, and Jenkins (2006) while applying the civilization theory of Huntington (1996) to explain a broader understanding of transnational terrorism, argue that it is "one form of this struggle (a clash of civilization) between civilizations and its increase due to declining Western hegemony and resurgence of the world's other cultures". There are different waves and types of transnational terrorism. Robison, Crenshaw, and Jenkins (2006), note the “3rd wave' Leftist terrorism used traditionally in national liberation framework to make appeals to the middle and lower class of less developed countries" where as the "4th wave" which they argued to be Islamic terrorism "use more lethal tactics justified in religious terms". They went further to explain the differences between the Leftist and Islamic terrorists by arguing that "unlike Leftist (terrorists) who see the state as a tool of ultimate social reforms, many Islamist radicals reject the secular state and its social innovations" (social reforms like freedoms and feminist aspirations of women). A good example of a leftist terrorist group is the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia—People's Army (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia) FARC whereas “Jama'atu Ahlissunnah lidda'awati wal Jihad” also known as the Boko Haram is a typical Islamic terrorist group.

Many scholars have posited several causes of transnational terrorism from different perspectives and understanding. Brand (2014) argues that terrorism occurs as a result of "strategic (expected gains minus expected costs), structural (environment triggers) and psychological causes (mental disposition-root and trigger causes)" And a detailed analysis according to Brand (2014) of psychological causes will expose us to the root causes which are "preconditions or background conditions which enable terrorism to flourish, terrorist acts to be enacted" and trigger causes which are "situational factors specific events that immediately precede the occurrence of terrorism". In summary, terrorist's acts are "designed to have psychological repercussions far beyond the immediate victim(s) of the terrorist attack and thereby to send a powerful message to a wider, watching target audience" (Hoffman, 2013, p. 83). This is the same case with Boko Haram, which claims to hate western education, lifestyle and culture, but at the same time, they are using western made technologies to spread their gospel of hate and terrorism via the internet.

A lot has been written about them recently, most importantly since its intense

campaign against the Nigerian state and when they pledged allegiance to ISIS; these have made them to appear obvious on the radar of international politics and scholarship. Nonetheless, happenings in the Boko Haram just like other terrorist groups are shrouded in secrecy and speculations. The attack on the UN Office in Abuja and the July 2009 Maiduguri uprising attracted much attention for the group. "Thus, a considerable number of articles on Boko Haram are now being written in the field of security studies" (Pérouse de Montclos, 2014). Furthermore, there are countless reasons why Boko Haram came about, which have been seen from economic, political, social, and most importantly, religious points of view.

Whereas Hoffman (2013) argues that the "religious imperative is vital to today's terrorism"; Pérouse de Montclos (2014) proffers that "despite its religious background, Boko Haram is political in nature because it contests Western values, challenges the secularity of the state, and reveals the corruption of a system that relies on a predatory ruling elite"; this argument by Pérouse de Montclos (2014) supports what Robison, Crenshaw, and Jenkins (2006) mean when they argue that "many Islamist radicals reject the secular state and its social innovations". Furthermore, Ekeanyanwu (2014) argues that Boko Haram is against the secularity of the state and also has economic objectives, when he argues that "they (Boko Haram) believe strongly that the system of taxation and banking in the country (Nigeria) that leads to the exploitation of the citizens, especially the poor, are against the spirit and teachings of Islam. They also kicked against man-made laws as practiced in Nigeria instead of the laws of Allah as taught by his holy Prophet Mohammed".

Omotola (2008) emphasizes on the socio-economic impact of the actions of the inept politicians in Nigeria when the poverty statistics of the different regions were laid bare, arguing that "the socioeconomic development statistics for the North are the worst in Nigeria, with 72 per cent of the people living in poverty compared with 27 percent in the South and 35 per cent in the Niger Delta". As we know Boko Haram is actively operational in the north-east of Nigeria. Aghedo (2011) tries to portray the northern part of Nigeria as "worse off in the level of infrastructural and human capacity development, as well as having the highest level of unemployment, particularly among young people, largely because of the phenomenon of Muslim child beggars (known locally as Almajiris)". However, Aghedo (2011) forgets to state that Nigeria had been ruled by northerners or Hausa/Fulani people (via military rule) "from 1983 to 1999 consecutively, and for the twenty-nine of Nigeria's thirty-nine years of independence (1960–1999)" (Abegunrin, 2003).

Ekeanyanwu (2014) sums up this part of the argument when he states that "the economic conditions in Nigeria have helped the group recruit members and get some sympathy, but economic conditions alone do not raise heartless murderers. If the Nigerian economy raised Boko Haram, most of us, including myself should be murderers and terrorists by now". Aghedo and Osumah (2012), Imobighe (2003), and Walker (2012) and many others have outlined the formation of Boko Haram and

drivers of the cross-border terrorism; though many differed along the line religion was commonly mentioned by all of them. Connell (2012) just like others has made policy recommendations and ways to tackle the cross-border terrorism. Whereas most scholars argue that the socio-economic situation of Nigeria in the '90s compounded by the mismanagement of public funds by politicians created the foot soldiers for Boko Haram, Pérouse de Montclos (2004) argues that “the almajiris who had flocked in large numbers to the urban areas owing to rural destitution, became a ready pool for recruitment and mobilisation”. Aghedo & Osumah (2012), also note that “essentially, members of Boko Haram are uneducated, school drop-outs, jobless youths, political thugs, and students from low socio-economic backgrounds. Its membership therefore largely relates to the depth of feeling about socioeconomic injustice, marginalisation and human insecurity”. Earlier, both Uba (2014) and Ekeanyanwu (2014) had attributed lack of quality education as one of the root causes and factor that sustains the growth of cross-border terrorism in the region and most especially aided the rise of Boko Haram in the West African sub-region.

Historical Overview of Boko Haram's Ideology and Formation

On January 1 1914, Lord Frederick Lugard on behalf of the British Empire joined the Northern and Southern Protectorates of the British Empire, to create Nigeria. There are three major ethnic groups in Nigeria: Igbo, Hausa-Fulani and Yoruba together with other 250 ethnic nationalities. The Northern Protectorate comprised the ethnic groups of Fulani, Hausa, Nupe, Kanuri, Gwari, Tiv, etc. They were predominantly Muslims who preferred Arabic education. These ethnic groups belong to Chadic language family which is spoken across the Sahara Desert. The Southern Protectorate comprised ethnic groups of Igbo, Yoruba, Benin, Ijaw, Kalabari, Ibibio, etc and were largely Christians. The predominant Christian orientation in the South also meant an exposure to western education.

Whereas Hausa/Fulani and Yoruba practiced monarchy, the Igbo and others in the southern part, had no supreme rulers. The Igbo people practiced something similar to gerontocracy - where age confers leadership rights and status. According to Acholonu (2008), every Igbo man feels in his bone marrow that he is a king in his own rights and domain. The Igbo happen to be the only ethnicity in the world whose 'kinglessness' is part of its identity, genealogy, cosmology, and philosophy. This difference among these major ethnic groups is one of the causes of misunderstanding and apathy. The Hausa/Fulani, for instance, do not understand “why an Igbo man can never grovel and roll on the ground before a fellow human being, no matter how highly placed” (Acholonu, 2008, p. 49).

These different ethnic groups isolated in three different regions of Nigeria were also endowed with different natural resources. The Eastern Region crude oil and palm oil, the Western Region had coconut, rubber and cocoa; while the Northern Region had peanuts and yam. As a result of the different climatic conditions, these

groups had varied clothing and architectural styles; though that of the Igbo and Yoruba did not differ much.

Shaw (1905), wife of Lord Lugard, gave a veiled narrative of how subservient the Hausa/Fulani can be to either an Emir or the British, unlike the “savages” in the southern portions of “the fertile belt” (Igbo and others) who are associated with self-deification or self-worship. When she posited that the superior races are in the northern and the inferior races reside in the southern portions of the fertile belt. As a result, the Hausa/Fulani were seen as the darlings of the British colonialists and this relationship was enhanced because the Hausa/Fulani practiced similar monarchical style of leadership like the British unlike the Igbo and others in the South who had something similar to gerontocracy.

The elite in the northern part of Nigeria did not allow western education to flourish for many reasons, which include but not limited to preventing conversion of their subjects to christianity, giving Islamic studies a good breeding ground and preserving their culture. The insurgencies and rebellions in Nigeria, whether against the state, intra ethnic or intra religious in nature, all have their roots from the colonial incursions of the British imperialist. Although, Uba (2014) argues otherwise when he states that “the amalgamation and colonization by the British did NOT, as far as I am concerned, cause the emergence of Boko Haram”.

However, it is our strong opinion that Boko Haram is one of the ugly manifestations of the loose state of the Nigerian federation because in truth, as Ekeanyanwu (2014, p. 3) argues,

Nigeria does not really exist. Shocking as this may sound; Nigeria is a mere geographical expression and fallout of an administrative convenience of the colonial masters, Britain. The basis of statehood does not exist. The nationals first converge as ethnic chauvinists, groups, religious bigots before thinking Nigeria. Most things in Nigeria (resources, power, positions etc) are discussed and shared along ethnic lines first, religion second, and then to hell with the centre called Nigeria.

The inability of the British colonial imperialists to appreciate the deadly consequences of the joining together of over 250 ethnic nationalities to create what is today known as Nigeria has continued to make peace and security elusive in the country. Huntington (1996) rightly (in our opinion) pointed to the potent role of culture and cultural identities in the cohesion or disintegration of people and conflicts in the post-Cold war era. He argues that “societies united by ideology or historical circumstances but divided by civilization either come apart, as did the Soviet Union...or are subjected to intense strain, as is the case with Ukraine, Nigeria(...)”.

Nigeria has been subjected to 'intense strain' in her pursuit of peace and security since independence, having survived a brutal Civil War from 1967-1970

when under the leadership of Colonel Chukwuemeka Odumegwu Ojukwu, a new state called "Biafra" emerged as a Christian enclave, prepared to resist something akin to what Rwanda would experience two decades later. Since then, different parts of Nigeria have experienced conflicts that are caused by both internal and external factors with ethnic, religious and political undertones.

This chapter lays emphasis on Boko Haram in order to understand the motivations of the transnational Islamic terrorists groups in the region, and aims to underscore the common and country-specific factors which serve as catalysts to their activities. Insurgencies in post colonial West Africa and before the era of Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab were merely politically motivated with ethnic undertones, and centred on the quest for political power. This new era which came with it, the likes of Boko Haram, brought about also politically and religiously motivated insurgencies cum terrorism that have cut across-borders and uniting people of similar faith who tend to have political narratives with elusive deadly aims and objectives which will only wreck havoc on societies unfortunate to harbour them.

The ideology of Boko Haram can be found within the frameworks of religion and politics; their brand of Islam in which "its followers are said to be influenced by the Koranic phrase which says: Anyone who is not governed by what Allah has revealed is among the transgressors" (Chothia, 2012); and their political objectives are influenced by its idea that "politics in northern Nigeria has been seized by a group of corrupt, false Muslims. Boko Haram is therefore waging war against them and the Federal Republic of Nigeria generally, to create a "pure" Islamic State ruled by Sharia Law" (Walker, 2012).

It is obvious, therefore, to argue here that religion and politics are two pivots driving the ideology on which Boko Haram lays its moral claim for its terrorist activities. This justifies Hoffman's (2013, p. 82) argument that "the religious imperative for terrorism is the most important defining characteristic of terrorist activities of today".

A view from the perspectives of the victims may appear to mean that Boko Haram members are fighting an ethno-religious war under the pretext of creating "a Sharia State ruled by Sharia Law". Itua (2014) quoted the past President of the Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN), Pastor Ayo Oritsejafor, who said "what is happening in the North-East is unacceptable to us. Christians are the main victims. We are not saying that other people are not affected (...). All the places where Boko Haram has foisted their flags are dominated by Christians". Ekeanyanwu (2014) also supported this assertion when he observed that "there is no contention that Boko Haram is anti-Christianity and has continued to bomb churches in the North".

What is in the ideology of Boko Haram? According to Yassin-Kassab (2014) while reviewing Kundnani (2014), argues that "the two dominant security approaches to Muslim citizens described by Kundnani – "culturalist" and "reformist" – highlight ideology rather than socio-political grievances". He went further to assert that

culturalism “locates the problem as Islam itself, a totalitarian ideology-culture incompatible with democratic modernity” whereas “reformism identifies the problem as a perversion of Islamic doctrine”.

Boko Haram's ideology can then be viewed from a Culturalist approach because the group has the backing from their holy text which gives it the moral justification to keep on conducting its affairs in order to achieve the ends as stated in the texts. Cook (2011) argues that Yusuf who was the founder of Boko Haram from his pronouncements during a BBC interview was able to disclose that they share ideologies similar to Salafism of the Wahabi variety. Armanios (2003) argues that “Wahabism generally refers to a movement that seeks to purify the Islamic religion of any innovations or practices that deviate from the seventh-century teachings of the Prophet Muhammad and his companions”. It means then that, issues regarding child-brides; no girl-child education or no western education at all; total covering of women; ban on the selling of alcohol; and many others will be reintroduced into a country that has over 70 million Christians.

Boko Haram's name, formations, strategies, sponsors, etc are shrouded in secrets and speculations. According to Mantzikos (2013), “it was founded around 2001 or 2002 by Mohammed Yusuf”. Some scholars have also argued that it “actually started in 1995 as Sahaba and was initially led by one Lawan Abubakar who later left for further studies at the University of Medina in Saudi Arabia”. Mohammed Yusuf is credited with the promotion and spread of Boko Haram including the articulation of its ideology. According to Pérouse de Montclos (2014), “the concept of taghut (idolatry), including secularism, democracy, and partisan politics; Western education and Westernisation; working for an un-Islamic government; and repudiation of the charge of Kharijism levelled against them by the local ulama, especially his former colleagues in the Wahhabi group in Borno” were the main signposts of Mohammed Yusuf's narratives. According to Ekeanyanwu (2014), “It was founded as a Sunni Islamic fundamentalist sect advocating for a strict adherence to Sharia Law. The group seeks for the establishment of an Islamic state in Nigeria. It views western education as corrupting Islam and weakening the religion”. Boko Haram has expanded its aims and objectives to include those of other terror groups in Africa.

Mohammed Yusuf remains the originator of Boko Haram but before him there were groups like them, and it is not wrong to argue that inspirations may have come from such groups, though their philosophy and doctrines may differ. The major Islamic movement that fought the Nigerian state was the Maitatsine movement, founded by a Cameroonian named Muhammadu Marwa, who lived in Kano. According to Isichei (1987), “the Maitatsine movement was greatly aided by the almajiri system, whereby parents entrust their sons to an Islamic teacher, who often takes them far from their homes. Some of the 'fanatics' imprisoned after the Kano riots were aged between ten and fourteen”. Though the doctrines of Boko Haram and the Maitatsine movement may differ they share similar hatred against western lifestyle

and education. No one knows if some of those almajiris taught by Maitatsine movement later formed their own groups. This argument is not impossible considering the similarities in ideologies.

Isichei (1987) also notes that many of such Islamic groups had existed before and after the formation of the Maitatsine-like Yan Izala, Tariqa brotherhoods (1978), and Fityanul Islam (1978). These groups may have differences in their doctrines but all are ready to wage war against non-Muslims or anything deemed un-Islamic. The readiness to fight against policies or persons deemed as being against their Islamic faith is not restricted to such group but is expressed by most people in the North-Eastern part of Nigeria, according to Isichei (1987). "In May 1979, members of the Moslem Students Society at Ahmadu Bello University attacked the Kegites, a branch of the Palm Wine Drinkers Club, a celebrated social club, the activities of which are sufficiently indicated in its title" (Isichei, 1987).

Growth of Transnational Terrorism in West Africa and Linkages to Terrorists in the Maghreb

Globalization brought with it the most recent and better way to communicate and connect with people in what used to be far away distances, and at the same time made far away troubles to become domestic problems. According to Onuoha (2011), "Globalisation, which has enhanced the movement of goods and people across borders, has equally facilitated the activities of criminal groups" across borders. Globalization also increased the desire of both the mass media and the terrorists to reach to a wider audience thereby facilitating the creation of fear to a greater magnitude.

Globalization, from Onuoha's (2011) perspective, not only "facilitated the activities of criminal groups" but also reinforced linkages of terrorist groups like Boko Haram, Al-Shabbab and al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). According to Pham (2011), what we know today as al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) was originally formed as Groupe Salafiste pour la Pre'dication et le Combat (GSPC) by Hassan Hattab, a former commander of Groupe Islamique Arme (GIA) in 1998. He was influenced by Ayman al_Zawahiri (the leader of al-Qaeda). It was an Algerian national group which wanted to take over government and implement Sharia Laws in the country although their objectives failed.

Despite the fact that GSPC was a nationalist movement in Algeria, it "nonetheless had relationships with other salafi-jihadi groups in the Maghreb, built on the convergence of interests and facilitated by both ties developed in battle fronts..." (Pham, 2011). According to Pham (2011) "the sending of its recruits to be foreign fighters in Iraq would ultimately lead to the GSPC's transformation into al Qaeda's recognized affiliate in North Africa" and eventually "brought to it a considerable number of Mauritians, Libyans, Moroccans, Tunisians, Malians, and Nigerians" to her fold. At this stage, AQIM moved beyond the national sphere into cross-border

affiliations and activities; with expert knowledge in attacking western target and kidnapping for ransom. Unlike AQIM, Al-Shabaab at one time controlled most of Somalia, according to Anzalone (2013),

In 2009-2010, the Somali militant group al-Shabab controlled most of central and southern Somalia south of the autonomous region of Puntland. Since the February 2011 military offensives by the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), Somali government troops, and Somali Sufi militia forces, al-Shabab has suffered a series of significant territorial and strategic setback.

Just like Boko Haram started as a small group and when faced with a bigger opposition like the Nigerian troops, they were able to win 'battles', the camp of the terrorists were emboldened, so also Al-Shabaab was "originally the small, youth militia arm of a relatively moderate Islamist organization that rose to power in Somalia in early 2006 and was radicalized and brought to prominence as a popular Islamist guerrilla movement by Ethiopia's invasion in December of that year" (Wise, 2011).

AQIM stands at a centre point in the terrorism business in the Maghreb and West Africa (Pham, 2011), "they provide mobile training camps especially in northern Mali, which provided training to nationals as far south as Nigeria, nationals from neighbouring countries, other countries in West Africa, as well as individuals recruited in Europe". AQIM is a typical example of a terror group that moved from a domestic terror organisation to a transnational terror organisation. Much of the assistance that AQIM gives to smaller groups like Boko Haram are meant to assist such groups in carrying out acts against the West and those of primary importance to the smaller groups.

It has been widely known in the intelligence community of the movement of persons from Nigeria to places under the influence of AQIM though no one knew to what extent these people will influence the body polity in Nigeria. According to Ammour (2012),

In 2006, the Nigerian intelligence services informed that members of the Nigerian group, Boko Haram, had received training by AQIM in Algeria. A first group, recruited by the Algerian Khaled Bernaoui, received training which was coordinated by the nephew of a former governor of a state in north-eastern Nigeria and a former chairman of a local government of the state of Niger in Nigeria.

Were actions taken to prevent any eventuality? It is obvious that sectionalism and the issue of religion and ethnicity greatly assisted the growth and maintenance of Boko Haram but no one suspected that they will someday capture towns and declare Islamic state in such towns.

When the news broke in January 19, 2013 that "Gunmen believed to be members of the extremist Boko Haram sect on Saturday attacked a detachment of Nigerian troops going to Mali as part of the Africa-led International Support Mission in Mali; killing two and injuring five others" (Ateboh, 2013), this underscored either a relationship or an extended hand of friendship from Boko Haram to AQIM. Zenn (2013) has long argued that

AQIM's support elevated Boko Haram from a Taliban-inspired religious movement under Yusuf into a full-fledged militant movement under Shekau and that Algerian terrorist group and Boko Haram had a long-term partnership, whereby the Algerian group would provide Boko Haram with instalments of \$250,000 and select Boko Haram members for training in kidnapping and bomb-making so that Boko Haram members could kidnap "white" expatriates in Nigeria and transfer the hostages to hideouts in the desert in exchange for more money and arms from the Algerians.

According to Connell (2012), spokesmen for both terror groups "confirmed collaboration between the two groups. A worrying aspect of this relationship is that AQIM's leader, Abu Musab Abd al-Wadoud, proclaimed his intent to supply it with weapons to defend Muslims in Nigeria and stop the advance of a minority of Crusaders". The support and assistance which Boko Haram got from these two terror groups, AQIM and Al-Shabaab, had greatly diminished the counter-terrorism efforts of the Nigerian army and emboldened these terror groups to have the guts to declare Islamic state in the biggest black nation on earth.

Techniques, Strategies, and Successes of Boko Haram in Nigeria and the West African Sub-Region

The similarities between AQIM and al-Qaeda are evident in many ways, including their doctrine, aspirations, and even how their propaganda materials are made and distributed. Primarily, they share similar Islamic doctrines of the implementation of Sharia law and the governance of the state via Sharia law. Nevertheless, there are major differences that exist among these terror groups. Boko Haram is primarily concerned with Islamizing Nigeria though recently, it has started operations in Cameroun and Niger; unlike AQIM which has been a transnational terror group in the Maghreb until recently that it has extended its operations into West Africa via Boko Haram. AQIM and Al-Shabaab are primarily involved in the use of kidnapping for ransom and other illicit activities to fund her activities, Boko Haram, on the other hand, generates funds from donations from politicians at home and abroad and from raiding commercial banks in Nigeria.

According to Pham (2011), "AQIM videos strongly resemble videos from Iraq

in terms of the music, Quranic citations, and filming of hits on enemy targets” and a search online for similar videos of Boko Haram will show you a great deal of resemblance of videos made by either AQIM and al-Qaeda. “The diffusion of videos highlighting the attacks to radical websites on the Internet is another practice imported from other al Qaeda-linked terrorist networks” (Pham, 2011). The use of twitter and YouTube to publicise their propaganda is widely known among these groups.

The use of suicide bombers to spread violence and even for any other reason was unprecedented in Nigeria, but with the coming of Boko Haram and their linkages with AQIM; “self-sacrifice and suicidal martyrdom” is now common as in “many Islamic and indeed other religious terrorist organizations (of) today” (Hoffman, 2006). According to Ammour (2012),

Algeria experienced their first suicide bomber at the UN Office in December 11, 2007 and it ought to be noted that suicide attacks were very rare in North Africa, even during the height of the Algerian Civil War which left hundreds of thousands dead or wounded, until in more recent years when legitimized by ideologues close to al-Qaeda, it became increasingly commonplace.

Karmon (2014) also observes that “AQIM itself symbolically relived the August 2003 attack by Al-Qaeda in Iraq on the UN's Mission in Baghdad, which killed Chief of Mission, Sergio Vieira de Mello, and caused the UN to depart from Iraq” (Karmon, 2014). In 2011 for the first time in Nigeria a Boko Haram “suicide bomber struck, driving his car full of explosives into the police headquarters in Abuja. Two months later, a second bomber blew up a UN building in Abuja. This was an attempt to tighten existing links with al-Qaeda in the Maghreb by illustrating Boko Haram's capacity to strike western institutions” (Xan Rice, 2012).

Why are these terrorist groups interested in attacking UN Offices and buildings? These are symbolic attacks to show-off their strength and willingness to attack the almighty United Nations Organisation of the world. AQIM and Al-Shabaab had attacked UN targets in their respective domains, Boko Haram's decision to attack the UN Office in Nigeria may be to prove their allegiance and loyalty to these other groups in order to receive support and camaraderie.

These terror groups commonly employ the use of arms and ammunitions like IEDs (improvised explosive devices), AK-47 rifles; assault rifles; general purpose machine guns (GPMG); RPGs and even APCs. According to Onuoha (2011),

Out of approximately 500 million illicit weapons in circulation worldwide in 2004, it was estimated that about 100 million are in sub-Saharan Africa, with eight to 10 million concentrated in the West African sub-region. Regrettably, more than half of these SALWs are in the hands of non-state actors and criminal groups. Nigeria is

both a producer and consumer of SALWs in the West African sub-region.

It is widely known that Boko Haram has been very successful in their campaign of terror, unfortunately, with little or no resistance from the Nigerian soldiers who complain of lack of equipment to fight these terrorists with a resultant effect of low morale on their part. Boko Haram has therefore been able to do the following since the group became militarised:

1. Break out their members and others from prisons in Nigeria. Boko Haram “has also attacked schools, churches, cell phone towers, media houses, and government facilities, including border posts, police stations and prisons (Zenn, 2013).
2. Rob banks and loot weapons from police stations. A significant amount of funding also comes from the crimes themselves; bank robberies are not an uncommon practice for Boko Haram (Connell, 2012).
3. Capture military barracks, according to Abubakar & Ford (2015), “Boko Haram overwhelmed the Multinational Joint Task Force and dislodged them from their base outside Baga after hours long fighting”, reported Maina Ma'aji Lawan, a Nigerian senator from the state of Borno, where Baga is located.
4. They have captured towns and declared Islamic states in many others although recent claims by President Buhari seem to suggest that Boko Haram is no longer holding any Nigerian city or town hostage.
5. Captured, maimed, sold and enslaved hundreds of people including the about 200 school girls from Chibok, whose kidnapping since April 2014 has remained a nightmare and unresolved.

It was considered unfortunate therefore that the Nigerian Army which was once known as the best in Africa and helped to restore peace in Liberia and Sierra Leone could not secure Nigeria. This underscores the importance of culture and cultural identities in a conflict situation like the one in north eastern part of Nigeria.

When one compares Boko Haram under Shekau with that of Mohammed Yusuf, the latter's struggles looks like a child's play. Shekau has transformed Boko Haram from a horde of unknown scarf tying Islamists with AK-47 rifles into a formidable transnational terror group that is running across international borders with armoured personnel carriers (APC) and trucks mounted with anti-aircraft guns; with the capabilities of declaring Islamic state in captured towns; and abducting schools girls to be sold in slave markets just as ISIS does. Boko Haram also has pledged allegiance to ISIS. As we can see nowadays, external socio-political and religious events are constantly influencing our local communities and how we live. Boko Haram, AQIM and others are influencing a lot of disfranchised and disgruntled youths into terrorism and barbaric acts. According to Robison, Crenshaw, & Jenkins (2006), the ultimate influencer was the Islamic revolution in Iran which "might have inspired Islamist terrorism and led to the proselytizing attempts to export this revolutionary

model to other Muslim societies”.

Lack of quality education and the presence of mostly Islamic education in the northern part of Nigeria have provided ready-made foot soldiers for Boko Haram which in effect has emboldened it to continue their campaign of terror. Robison, Crenshaw, & Jenkins (2006) argue that "formal educational systems, particularly those that are not balanced by a dynamic economy and strong civil society may provide recruiting grounds for radical causes". The lack of quality education, poor economy and almost no presence of civil society in Nigeria have been catalysts for not only terrorism but also all other forms of criminal behaviour. Imobighe (2003) brought home the argument of Robison, Crenshaw, & Jenkins (2006), when he argues that "Some politicians and 'conflict merchants' take advantage of the huge pool of poverty and unemployment by recruiting and arming such people in pursuit of selfish political interests”

Once more Robison, Crenshaw, & Jenkins (2006) drummed home the need for governance and not government in every country, since "repressive states, especially those that combine; hard repression (coercive violence) with claims to popular responsiveness are likely to incite dissident terrorism". The unjustified coercive violence unleashed on the members of Boko Haram which culminated in the death of their leader Mohammed Yusuf, was one of the catalysts for the war they are waging against Nigeria.

Aghedo & Osumah (2012) gave a summary of the factors that have emboldened Boko Haram when they argued that Boko Haram's success could be attributed to them having foreign backing, the ineffectiveness of the military, and support from politicians and Islamic clerics.

Another significant factor that has assisted Boko Haram, whose members are mostly Hausas and Kanuris (both tribes are among the major ethnic groups in Niger, Nigeria and Chad), is the presence of aliens in the Northern parts of Nigeria, who share the same ethnicity and religion with Northern Nigerians but are not nationals of Nigeria. This problem has been there for decades, according to Isichei (1987),

After the Kaduna and Bulumkutu risings, the then Transport Minister, Umaru Dikko, said it had become necessary to take a fresh look at the free movement of ECOWAS citizens. The Aniagolu Commission recommended, and the government accepted, the deportation of illegal foreign immigrants. In 1984, after the Yola outbreak, 1,000 illegal aliens were collected in Kano, for deportation.

It means that the porous nature of the borders in the northern parts of Nigeria assisted in part by the cultural affinity the Nigerian Hausas have with the Hausas in other countries that share the same border with Nigeria have made it possible for Boko Haram to cross the borders at will and carry out their activities without worries.

Another vital factor which has promoted the campaign of Boko Haram was the lack of support and equipment to the Nigerian military, and the presence of “leaks or moles inside the Nigerian military, who were leaking information to Boko Haram. They were leaking certain bits of information, training information and perhaps information on the team itself” (DeCapua, 2014). Therefore, it turned out that Boko Haram was better equipped both in military hardware and psychologically than the Nigerian army; who are always willing to abandon their barracks and run for their lives at the advance of the members of Boko Haram.

A very significant factor that has benefited Boko Haram is the inability of the masses in the North Eastern part of Nigeria to alienate themselves from the terror group. It is argued that the group received sympathy from the masses because they are Muslims and Hausa/Fulani like Boko Haram. But a worrying aspect was the speech which Chief Femi Fani-Kayode -former Nigerian Minister of Aviation- accused Nigeria's incumbent President, Muhammadu Buhari to have made when he was the Presidential Candidate of the main opposition party in the 2011 Presidential Election thus: “in other words, rehabilitate them, grant them amnesty and pay them every month, concluding that any attack on the Boko Haram sect was a declaration of war on the people of Northern Nigeria” (Jimoh, 2015). History has since forgiven and forgotten this statement as Buhari is now the Commander-in-Chief fighting Boko Haram to a standstill. Unlike in Kenya, the citizens rallied around their government and gave them the support in fighting Al-Shabaab.

The initial lack of support from powerful nations like the US to sell military hardware to the Nigerian government under Goodluck Jonathan also contributed to the success of Boko Haram as a cross-border terror organisation. We are aware the current Nigerian government under President Muhammadu Buhari is relating well with the West. How this translates to the defeat of Boko Haram remains to be seen.

Related to the inability of the Nigerian government to get hold of the right military weapons to prosecute the war on terror, is the flagrant misappropriation of budgeted sums for military hardware by security operatives, the military hierarchy, and some former and present politicians of the PDP family. The trial of some of the ring leaders is ongoing but the charges against Colonel Dasuki, the former National Security Adviser to President Goodluck Jonathan, is highly revealing of the depth of corruption in the Nigerian political system. It is very disturbing that the Goodluck Jonathan administration tried and sentenced some military personnel for abandoning their duty post when attacked by Boko Haram and did nothing to those who embezzled the monies meant to properly arm these military personnel to fight Boko Haram. The point here, however, is that corruption in the military and amongst politicians made it difficult to defeat Boko Haram and inadvertently made the group a success as a cross-border terror organisation.

Boko Haram and Transnational Terrorism in Africa: Implications for Political Communication and Media Development

Boko Haram's relative success and transition from a rag tag group to a cross-border terror organisation has been partly facilitated by the type of media coverage, which sometimes elevates such organisations beyond their actual sizes. Media coverage of terrorism has been more beneficial to terror organisations than of the people that the media are responsible to. This is rather ironic and makes it imperative for us to begin to look at the implications of media coverage of terrorism on political communication and media development, since we have argued that the media remain a vital and available instrument of exploitation by the terrorist to achieve their evil objectives.

In other words, terrorist organisations take advantage of the media's need for "bad news" which is "good news" to intimidate its victims and potential victims and create an atmosphere of fear and general insecurity. This is the terrorist's ultimate objective and the media have remained a willing communication channel towards achieving this objective. Based on this understanding, we accept Hoffman's (2006) argument as captured in Ekeanyanwu & Ajakaiye (2016) thus "that without media coverage, terrorist attacks impact would be arguably wasted, remaining narrowly confined to the immediate victims of the attack, rather than reaching the wider target audience. Scholars like Nacos support this view, equating lack of massive media coverage to the falling of the proverbial tree in the forest. If no one learnt of an incident, it would be as if it had not occurred. In essence, it would have no significance and with time, lose relevance". Our argument here is that each time the media release messages and show the atrocities committed by terrorist organisations, the information function of such releases and coverage is subdued under the fear factor such coverage causes the general populace. The consequences are unimaginable and have dire implications for political communication and media development.

One major implication of our argument above is that the public's right to know may suffer if the media begin to under-report terrorists and their activities. This may not be necessarily so if the recommendations of Ekeanyanwu & Ajakaiye (2016) are given a second thought. According to them,

The solution ... is to exploit the benefits of Expert Journalism and manage the risks associated with it. So far, in the Nigerian-Boko Haram case, the media have largely done their reporting the traditional way – attempting to play the "objectivity" card that does not really exist. Experts now prefer the more inclusive and realistic term "transparency" than the vague and unrealistic term called objectivity. Expert Reporting involves putting some expert reporters on a story for a long period until such issue disappears. Based on the reporters' expert knowledge, investigative abilities, and findings, they can draw their

own conclusions for the public and give their own “expert view” of the situation instead of the traditional “all sides view” of the issue that has caused more harm than good (Ekeanyanwu & Ajakaiye, 2016, p. 130).

A major implication of Boko Haram insurgency for media development in the African continent is the urgent need for the African continent to create its own “African News Network (ANN)” to manage the big stories from the continent. So far, what we have had in the international media coverage of cross-border terrorism is largely based on CNN's and Aljazeera's Effect or framing of such issues. In other words, we have the West/Christian's view represented by CNN and the Arab/Muslim's view represented by Aljazeera. In all of these, Africa has no voice of her own. CNN thinks Boko Haram is a terror organisation while Aljazeera differs and calls the group “insurgents”. What does Nigeria and Africa that are direct victims of the group activities think? There is no comparable network of the magnitude of CNN and Aljazeera in Africa to create the same effect as the CNN Effect or Aljazeera Effect to challenge such ideology-based coverage. In all, Africa remains misinformed about events in her own backyard.

Another major implication of Boko Haram terrorism on political communication and media development in Nigeria and Africa is the issue of repositioning the media industry to play media advocacy role in checkmating the adverse effects straightforward reports are doing to the psyche of the Nigerian/African people who are victims of cross-border terrorism. Media advocacy will reposition the media industry in Africa to preach against violence and terrorism in whatever form and for whatever reasons. Media advocacy does follow the traditional standards of “objectivity” reporting on wanting to hear from every side in the conflict. From the standpoint of media advocacy, there are no sides in the Boko Haram or terrorist attacks situation. There is only one victim, the people, who are daily maimed and caught in a war they know nothing about and cannot possibly stop. It is the expectation that the media will become advocates against all forms of violence on the innocent civilian population and condemn terrorism in the strongest terms. The media are also expected to reduce or possibly eliminate the amount of quality time given to terrorists and their cause, as part of the media advocacy regime.

To further support our thesis for media advocacy as fallout of cross-border terrorism in Africa, it is advised that the Nigerian media consider the six principles developed by the Kathleen Hall Jamieson and Martin E. P. Segliman Committee that was set up after the September 11 2001 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center, in New York. The Committee's work is entitled “*Six Rules for Government and Press on Terrorism: Undercutting Fear Itself*” We strongly recommend that the Nigerian/African media should consider a slight modification in adopting these recommendations in their coverage of Boko Haram terror activities (See Ekeanyanwu & Ajakaiye, 2016).

Recommendations

In order to reduce and in the end stop incessant violent conflicts in Africa, we must redraw the post-colonial borders through accommodation and compromise that will suit not only ethnic interests but also satisfy religious sentiments. This may involve respecting the rule of self-determination, allowing partial autonomy with fairness to these numerous peoples of Africa or giving voice to all ethnic nationalities in the business of governance. If not, we are yet to see the worst. In the short term, the following recommendations can greatly reduce the growth of Boko Haram as a major terror network in Africa.

There should be an urgent need for the affected Governments in Africa to become more diplomatic in handling the issue of terrorism. In essence, there is also need for all state actors to show a willingness to condemn violence no matter whose ox is gored and to act in concert to combat terrorism. At the time, Nigeria should involve none state actors like NGOs, Churches, Mosques etc in the fight to combat the narratives of the terrorists.

There is also the urgent need now to stop and eliminate the Boko Haram threat with military might. The Buhari Administration in Nigeria is rallying support among his African neighbours to see that Boko Haram is decimated and we hope the Government is not playing lip service to such efforts. The Nigerian security forces including the army and police need to be reformed, reorganized, re-trained, and better equipped with a better welfare package for the personnel. The Nigerian government should also immediately take control of their borders most especially in the North East.

The government should invest in infrastructural development which will create more jobs, reduce unemployment, and enhance academic and medical institutions with the objective of creating a conducive environment for human and material development.

The Federal Government of Nigeria should convene a Sovereign National Conference (SNC) where all the aggrieved ethnic nationalities should be heard, including the sympathisers of Boko Haram. Nothing should be off the table in such a conference. Let the true representatives of Nigerians decide the basis of Nigeria's unity or continued existence. Nigeria's fate should be in the hands of Nigerians.

The Nigerian government should bespoke education to counter the underpinning narrative and make the Boko Haram philosophy less appealing to potential members of the sect. We, however, acknowledge that education alone is not enough to address the Boko Haram saga. There is need to supplement education with the provision of incentives (e.g. other related infrastructure) as means of empowering potential recruits.

In conclusion, we think the Boko Haram issue is currently highly politicized. Until all and sundry see the evil intentions and join forces to eliminate this group, the

continued existence of Nigeria may become a priority again on the table.

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